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ABSTRACT
We develop and estimate a model where technology diffusion depends on the level of
productivity embodied in capital and where this is, in turn, determined by two key mechanisms: the
rate at which the quality embodied in new technology vintages increases (embodiment) and the gains
from varieties induced by the introduction of new vintages (variety). In our model, these two effects
are related to technology adoption decisions taken at two different levels. The capital goods
suppliers’ decisions of when to adopt a given vintage determines the embodiment margin. The
workers’ decisions of which of the adopted vintages to use in production determines  the variety
margin.
Estimation of our model for a sample of 19 technologies, 21 countries, and the period
1870-1998 reveals that embodied productivity growth is large for many of the technologies in our
sample. On average, increases in the variety of vintages available is a more important source of
growth than the increases in the embodiment margin. There is, however, substantial heterogeneity
across technologies. Where adoption lags matter, they are largely determined by lack of educational




269 Mercer Street, 725




Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Research and Statistics Group
33 Liberty Street, 3
rd Floor
New York, NY 10045
bart.hobikn@ny.frb.org1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Most cross-country diﬀerences in levels of output per capita are due to diﬀerences in the level of total
factor productivity (TFP), rather than diﬀerences in the levels of factor inputs.1 These cross-country TFP
disparities can be divided into two parts: productivity diﬀerences from countries using diﬀerent ranges of
technologies and diﬀerent levels of eﬃciency with which technologies are operated.
In this paper, we assess the relative importance of the economic mechanisms that inﬂuence the range
of technologies a country uses. In particular, we answer the following two questions: ‘What are the key
economic aspects that diﬀer across technologies that inﬂuence the speed of diﬀusion?’ and ‘What are the
key cross-country diﬀerences in endowments, institutions, and policies that impinge on technology diﬀusion?’
We answer these questions by developing and estimating a model of one of the key determinants of
technology diﬀusion, the level of productivity embodied in the capital goods associated with a technology.
In our model, agents adopt technologies at two diﬀerent levels. First, a capital good producer decides whether
to incur the ﬁxed cost of adopting a capital good that embodies a new vintage of the particular technology
(e.g. the Pentium as a new vintage of microprocessor). As in Parente and Prescott (1994), the size of the
adoption costs determine the adoption lag at the country level.
In addition, each worker that uses a given technology (e.g. microprocessors) decides which of the vintages,
associated with this technology and available in the country, to use in production (i.e. Pentium vs. Intel
IV). Heterogeneity across workers in the productivity of each vintage introduces a smooth adoption of new
vintages at the micro level.
These adoption decisions endogenously determine the level and evolution of productivity embodied in
the technology. The introduction of vintages with higher embodied productivity raises the overall level of
productivity. It also increases the range of vintages available for production. As this range increases, workers
obtain a gain from variety, which also raises the average level of productivity embodied in capital.
When the number of available vintages is very small, an increase in the number of varieties has a relatively
large eﬀect on embodied productivity. As this number increases, the productivity gains from such an increase
decline. This leads to curvature in the embodied productivity level.
This curvature in embodied productivity translates into similar non-linearities in the evolution of available
measures of technology, such as the number of units of capital that embody a given technology or the output
produced with these units. For each of these technologies, this allows us to estimate the growth rate of
productivity embodied in new vintages, as well as the determinants of the costs of adopting new vintages
that generate adoption lags.
We estimate the model taking advantage of the historical data set on technology measures from Comin
and Hobijn (2004). This data set covers 19 types of technologies, for 21 industrialized countries, over the
1Klenow and Rodr´ ıquez-Clare (1997), Hall and Jones (1999), and Jerzmanowski (2004).
2period 1870 - 1998.
To explore the determinants of adoption lags, we assume that the costs of adopting new vintages are
functions of the following variables: human capital, in line with Nelson and Phelps (1966) and Chari and
Hopenhayn (1991), the degree of trade openness, as emphasized by Coe and Helpman (1995) and Holmes
and Schmitz (2001), the degree of democracy, as proposed by Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson,
and Robinson (2005), as well as income per capita as a proxy for relative factor endowments, consistent with
Basu and Weil’s (1998) appropriate technology hypothesis.
We ﬁnd that for several of our technologies, such as computers, robots, planes, electricity and steel, new
vintages embody signiﬁcantly more productivity than old vintages. In terms of the determinants of the
adoption lags, we ﬁnd that technologies such as PC’s, robots and electricity are complementary to human
capital in the sense that human capital reduces the adoption lags for these technologies. Trade openness
tends to reduce the adoption lags of transportation technologies, such as passenger and cargo aviation as
well as sail and motor shipping. Other factors, such as the degree of democracy, do not seem to be very
important for explaining the variation in the range of vintages used, but might still aﬀect the intensity with
which technologies are used.
Our model of endogenous embodied productivity generates a diﬀu s i o np a t ht h a tﬁts the data quite closely
for most of the technologies in our sample. The R2sa r eh i g h ,e v e na f t e rﬁltering out the exogenous trends,
country ﬁxed eﬀects and interest rate eﬀects that the technology adoption mechanism in our model does not
account for.
We ﬁnd that the average growth rate of embodied productivity over the periods studied is large for
most of the technologies in our sample. The relative importance of the two adoption margins, however,
varies substantially across technologies. This heterogeneity in the results emphasizes the importance of the
multi-technology character of our analysis. On average, the increase in the number of available varieties is
a more important source of growth in embodied productivity than the actual productivity embodied in the
best adopted vintages.
This paper is related to various strands of the literature. It is closely related to the empirical diﬀusion
literature (Griliches 1957, Mansﬁeld, 1961, Gort and Klepper 1982, among others) which has estimated
logistic diﬀusion curves for a relatively small number of technologies and countries. Our model is consistent
with this micro evidence because the workers adoption decisions generate a (quasi) logistic diﬀusion pattern
at the micro level.
The logistic diﬀusion curve in our model diﬀers from that in the empirical literature because it results
from the optimizing behavior of agents. There are two other important factors that diﬀerentiate our paper
from this literature. First, our approach only requires the use of widely available aggregate data to estimate
the diﬀusion processes. Therefore, our analysis covers more technologies and countries than if we had to
3rely on scarce micro data.2 Second, by embedding the micro adoption decisions in a macro model, we can
explore their aggregate implications.
This paper is also related to the macro technology adoption literature (i.e. Parente and Prescott 1994,
and Basu and Weil, 1998). Contrary to our model, these studies are not based on models of adoption that
are suﬃciently rich to be brought to the data. As a result, empirical analyses conducted with these models
are restricted to calibration exercises.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next we present the model and derive analytical expressions
for the diﬀusion curves that we estimate. Section 3 contains the empirical analysis. Section 4 summarizes
our ﬁndings and presents directions for future research. For the sake of brevity, many of the mathematical
derivations are relegated to the Appendix.
2M o d e l
The aim of our model is to explain the paths of aggregate measures of capital and output associated with
particular types of embodied technologies. For this purpose, we develop a model of endogenous technology
in which adoption occurs at two diﬀerent levels. First, capital goods producers determine when to adopt
and start producing capital goods that embody a given level of productivity. Second, workers decide which
of the adopted capital goods to use in production.
The model incorporates the following notion of technology. Each type of technology is used to produce a
particular good or service. For example, sail ships are used to provide sail shipping services. Of course, not
all sail ships are the same. Some sail ships, like clippers, belong to a more advanced technological vintage
than others, like schooners. Goods or services produced with similar technologies are aggregated into sectoral
output. For example, merchant shipping services are the result of the shipments provided with sail ships, as
well as steam and motor ships.
In terms of notation, workers are indexed by l, technology vintages are inxed by v, technology types are
indexed by τ, sectors are indexed by s, and time is indexed by t. For example, Y
(v)
l,t denotes the output
worker l produces using technology vintage v at time t, Y
(τ)
v,t is the level of output of technology vintage v
of technology type τ, Y
(s)
τ,t is the output produced with technology type τ in sector s,a n dYs,t is the output
of sector s, Yt is aggregate output (i.e. GDP).
We structure the presentation of the model as follows. First, we set up and solve the technology choice
problem of the worker. Then we analyze the adoption decision of the capital goods suppliers. Next we
2Another strand of the literature has also used more aggregate measures of diﬀusion to explore the determinants of adoption
lags (Saxonhouse and Wright, 2000, and Caselli and Coleman, 2001) or the shape of technology diﬀusion (Manuelli and Seshadri,
2004) for one technology. Our paper diﬀers from these three studies in that (i) it develops a diﬀerent approach to modeling and
estimating the forces that shape technology diﬀusion and (ii) it covers a wider range of technologies and countries.
4explore the aggregate implications of these technology adoption decisions. Finally, we derive the reduced
form equations that we estimate and describe our identiﬁcation strategy.
2.1 Worker’s technology choice
A worker that uses technology type τ has to choose which of the available vintages, v,o ft h a tt y p et ou s e .
Output is homogenous across vintages of the same technology type. Because this technology choice is essen-
tially a discrete choice, we base our model on the discrete choice problem that is used as the microfoundation
of the multinomial logit model. 3













τ reﬂects the ﬁrst vintage of technology type τ that was ever introduced and v
(s)
τ,t reﬂects the most
recent and modern vintage of technology type τ provided to workers at time t. Let the level of output that















,w h e r e0< α < 1( 1 )
where K
(v)
l,t is the number of units of the vintage speciﬁc capital good, Z
(τ)
v is the level of productivity
embodied in capital of vintage v and ε
(v)
l,t is an idiosyncratic, time, worker, and vintage speciﬁc productivity
shock.
Capital goods of vintage v are rented at the rental rate R
(τ)
v,t and the technology type speciﬁcp r i c eo f
output is given by P
(s)
τ,t . Conditional on the productivity shock ε
(v)
l,t , the technology level, Z
(τ)
v ,t h er e n t a l
rate, R
(τ)
v,t, and the output price, P
(s)
τ,t, a worker using technology vintage v chooses the level of the capital
input, K
(v)












The proﬁt-maximizing level of the capital input is such that rental expenditures exhaust a fraction α of
revenue.
Therefore, the surplus that the worker produces when he uses technology vintage v (i.e. Π
(v)
l,t )i sa
fraction (1 − α) of total revenue. Hence, the worker will choose that technology that maximizes revenue.
The worker’s technology choice is assumed to not aﬀect the equilibrium price level, so this is equivalent to
choosing the technology vintage that maximizes output.





















, and the output price P
(s)
τ,t,aw o r k e rl em-
ployed in technology type τ chooses the vintage v that satisﬁes
Y
(v)
l,v ≥ Y (v0)
l,v0 for all v0 ∈ V
(τ)
t (3)
3This is commonly referred to as the ARUM, or Additive Random Utility Model (Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992).






























and small letters denote natural logarithms. Y
(τ)
v,t is the worker’s supply function at ε
(v)
l,t =0 .
The actual distribution of choices made depends on the distribution of the shocks. We assume that the
worker-speciﬁc technology shocks are identically distributed for all workers, vintages, and points in time,















,w h e r eµ>0( 6 )
where the variance of the shocks is increasing in µ.











































Because there is a continuum of vintages, this is not a proper probability but can better be interpreted as
our continuous vintage approximation to the ﬁnite number of vintages case.4

































By the law of large numbers, this probability equals the share of workers using technology τ who choose
vintage v,w h i c hi sw h yw ed e n o t ei tb yS
(τ)
v,t. These share equations are the same as those implied by
the optimal demand of each technology vintage when the production function is a CES aggregate of the
continuum of vintages.5
In this context, 1/µ can be interpreted as the elasticity of substitution of technology vintages. Intuitively,
the smaller the variance of the idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the more the demand responds to changes
in the relative average productivity level Y
(τ)
v,t of vintage v and the more quickly workers substitute away
toward other technology vintages in response to a change in Y
(τ)
v,t relative to that of other vintages.
4In practical applications, discrete choice models consider the choice over a ﬁnite number of choices, and the choice for which
the random utility is maximized is well-deﬁned. Because we aim to implement the worker’s technology choice decision into a
more general equilibrium framework, our model is such that the set of available vintages contains a continuum of choices and,
because of that, in principle, the worker obtains an unbounded level of productivity.
5In this sense, we are using the production function equivalent of the result that aggregate CES preferences can be interpreted
as the result of underlying individual agents facing a discrete choice problem. See Feenstra (1995) and Anderson, de Palma,
and Thisse (1992) for both applications and derivations of this result on the consumer side.
6Let L
(s)
τ,t be the number of workers who use technology type τ in sector s at time t.T h e n u m b e r o f
























where the constant C depends only on µ.
As we show in Appendix A, output produced using a particular technology type is represented by a CES



















































This equation illustrates the three sources of productivity growth in our model: (i) The increasing number
of varieties, as in Romer (1990), is reﬂe c t e db yt h es i z eo ft h es e to ft e c h n o l o g yv i n t a g e s ,V
(τ)
t , adopted in the
country; (ii) investment speciﬁc technological change, similar to Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997)6,
is reﬂected by the increases in output due to declines in R
(τ)
v,t;a n d( iii) embodied technological change is
reﬂected in the diﬀerent levels of total factor productivity for diﬀerent vintages, Z
(τ)
v .
2.2 Adoption at the aggregate level
Every instant, a constant number of new technology vintages is invented in the world. The most recently
invented vintage, which we denote by v
(s)
τ,t, is the world technology frontier. Without loss of generality we
assume that v
(s)
τ,t = t. As in Johansen (1959) and Solow (1960), newer vintages are technologically superior














τ > 0d e n o t e st h eg r o w t hr a t eo fe m b o d i e dp r o d u c t i v i t y .
A newly invented vintage is not available for production in the economy until a capital good supplier
adopts it. Let v
(s)
τ,t be the most advanced vintage adopted, then the adoption lag in technology τ is
6Under the assumptions in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997), embodied technological change and investment-
speciﬁc technological change are not separately identiﬁable, and capital can be deﬁned in terms of quality-adjusted units such
that there is only investment speciﬁc technological change. Because we measure particular types of units of capital, like cars,
telephones or merchant ships, such quality adjustment assumptions are not applicable to our empirical analysis. Therefore, we
will explicitly distinguish between these two types of technological progress in our model.
7D
(s)
τ,t = t − v
(s)
τ,t ≥ 0 (13)











Producers of capital goods have a patent on the technology that enables them to produce a particular
vintage of capital good, v, at the unit production cost Q
(τ)
v,t. This production process is assumed to be
reversible. We assume that the production cost, Q
(τ)
v,t, is the same across technology vintages and that Z
(τ)
v,t











The producers choose the path of rental rates R
(τ)
v,t to maximize the present discounted value of their























and the demand function for K
(τ)
v,t implied by the capital input decisions made by the workers that use
technology type τ.
As we show in Appendix A, the monopolist chooses a rental price that equals a gross markup times the























Here, 1/η is the net markup of the rental price over the vintage-speciﬁcu s e rc o s t . 7


























τ,t is technology type but not vintage speciﬁc and is derived in Appendix A.
































7The user cost, UC
(s)
τ,t, is the same as that derived in Jorgenson (1963).
8Thus, we obtain an aggregate Cobb-Douglas production function for the output produced using technology
type τ in sector s.8 The random productivity model at the worker level yields a factor of labor augmenting
technological progress Z
(s)
τ,t that is a CES aggregate of the underlying vintage speciﬁc productivity levels.
2.3 Entry into sector
The idiosyncratic productivity shocks cause uncertainty about an individual worker’s labor productivity.
Firms act as insurers that insure the workers’ idiosyncratic labor productivity risk.by oﬀe r i n gac o n t i n u u m
of workers a contract at the competitive wage Wt. Because the ﬁrm employs a continuum of workers, it pools
their idiosyncratic risks and thus faces no risk over the average labor productivity. Free entry of ﬁrms into
the sector implies that, in equilibrium, the competitive wage rate equalizes the average proﬁt per worker.
That is










Combining this free entry condition with (20), we ﬁnd that the implied price level of output of technology


















which corresponds to the unit production cost function of the Cobb-Douglas production function with factor
prices Wt for labor and R
(s)




To consider the relationship between the adoption of the technologies in our sample and aggregate economic
conditions, we need to make some assumptions about how output produced with various technologies ag-
gregates into sectoral output and how sectoral output aggregates into aggregate output. We assume a CES













,w h e r eθs > 1 (24)
Given the technology type production functions that we derived before, we can write the unit production
























8This is an application of the result in Fisher (1965), who proves the existence of an aggregate capital stock in case of an
underlying vintage speciﬁc Cobb-Douglas production function.
9Note that we could have derived this from ﬁr s tp r i n c i p l e sa sw eh a v ed o n ef o rt h et e c h n o l o g yt y p ep r o d u c t i o nf u n c t i o n .

















and UCs,t and Qs,t are similar CES aggregates.
The second aggregation level determines how sectoral output is related to aggregate output. We assume
that aggregate output, is produced using a constant returns to scale production function with the outputs of
each of the individual sectors as inputs. We also assume that demand for output of sector s is characterized










where ρs is the elasticity of substitution, and the price of aggregate output, Pt, has been normalized to 1.
Cost minimization and free entry in the production of the ﬁnal good implies that, in equilibrium, ﬁnal
good producers make zero proﬁts and total revenue of the ﬁnal good producers equals their costs of buying
sectoral output as intermediate inputs. Because the share of labor equals (1 − α) for each intermediate input,
so does the aggregate share of labor. As a result,




2.5 Equilibrium technology adoption
Technology adoption in our model occurs at two levels. The ﬁrst is at the aggregate level. That is, capital
goods suppliers face a cost of adopting a technology vintage and only choose to incur this cost when the
present discounted value of their ﬂow proﬁts is greater than or equal to the adoption cost.
At time t, the present discounted value of the capital good monopolist supplying vintage v is given by
(19). We denote the cost of adopting technology vintage v at time t by A
(τ)























τ,t,w h e r eb
(s)
τ,t,ν > 0 (29)
This formulation of the adoption costs contains four terms. The second and third terms reﬂect the higher
cost of adopting technologies that are more sophisticated both relative to the world technology frontier and
in absolute terms. The fourth term, f M
(s)
τ,t, is related to the market value for the technology type and makes
the model tractable. For our purposes, the most important term is the ﬁrst. It reﬂects additional factors
that aﬀect the cost of adopting new technology vintages.
When estimating the model, we make b
(s)
τ,t a function of several variables that have been proposed in the
literature as important determinants of the size of adoption barriers at the aggregate level. By identifying
how b
(s)
τ,t depends on these variables, we can understand how these variables aﬀect both the cross-country
and the time series costs of technology adoption.




v,t , which is the best vintage that will







τ,t = t − D
(s)
















τ,t = 0 then technology type τ is operated at the world technology frontier. The higher b
(s)
τ,t,t h e
further the adoption of technology type τ lags behind the frontier.10
The second level of technology adoption is the technology choice is the individual worker’s technology
decision. As we derive in Appendix A, in equilibrium, the share of workers who use vintages that are more
advanced than v ≥ v
(s)
























´ ,w h e r eΨ(t;g)=
1
1 − e−g max{t,0} (31)
when
v(s)




This is an approximately logistic adoption curve at the individual worker level. The diﬀerence between












which implies that the share of workers who use the technology before it is invented is zero. This term is
absent in an actual logistic curve.
An actual logistic adoption curve, therefore, cannot be the reduced form adoption curve from this model,
since it implies that the adoption share is positive at any point in time (it asymptotes to zero for t →− ∞ ).
This would counterfactually imply that technologies are adopted before they are actually invented.11
The measure Σ
(τ)
v,t is very similar to the adoption share measures that are commonly studied in empirical
technology adoption studies, like Griliches (1957), Mansﬁeld (1961), Gort and Klepper (1982) and Skinner
and Staiger (2005). The crucial diﬀerence is that, while the logistic curves used in empirical applications are
assumed, the (quasi) logistic evolution of Σ
(τ)
v,t results from the optimizing behavior of workers confronted
with a technology choice.
10This formulation does not preclude a corner solution where ∂v
(s)
τ,t/∂t<0. This would mean that the best vintage adopted
at time t is actually determined by the best vintage adopted before time t and not by v
(s)
τ,t. We abstract from this case and
assume that b
(s)









11Comin, Hobijn, and Rovito (2006) estimate logistic adoption curves for many technologies and countries and ﬁnd that the
implied 1% adoption date is often before the actual invention date of the technologies.
112.6 Measures of technology diﬀusion
The main goal of this paper is to estimate γ
(s)
τ and the determinants of D
(s)
τ,t to obtain a better understanding
of what the key economic mechanisms that inﬂuence the diﬀusion of technology are and what consequences
this has for growth and development. Attempts to answer this question using the share measures developed
in the empirical diﬀusion literature and in (31) are likely to be unsuccessful because there is no cross-country
data set that reports these measures for a signiﬁcant number of technologies.




τ,t instead takes advantage of the model’s implications for other
measures of technology for which we have data. In particular, we have two technology measures: the number
of units of capital goods of a particular technology type, K
(s)
τ,t, and the amount of output produced with a
particular technology type, Y
(s)
τ,t .















+(ρs − θs)((1− α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t)





















+(ρs − θs)((1− α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t)





k are measure- and sector-speciﬁc constants.
These equations are driven by the technology-type-speciﬁc levels of embodied productivity, z
(s)
τ,t, investment-
speciﬁc technological change, q
(s)
τ,t,a n dt h eu s e rc o s t s ,uc
(s)
τ,t. Our model of adoption presents mechanisms
that endogenize z
(s)




τ,t). The other two
driving forces in equations (34) and (35) are exogenous from the perspective of our model.



































At the heart of our analysis are two mechanisms by which the agents’ adoption decisions aﬀect the
level of embodied productivity, z
(s)
τ,t. These are represented by the third and fourth terms in (36). First,
as newer vintages with higher embodied productivities are adopted in the economy, the level of embodied
productivity increases. The Embodiment term in (36) reﬂects the productivity embodied in the best vintage
adopted in the economy. Second, as the range of technology vintages available for production increases,
12workers are more likely to sample a high ideosyncratic productivity shock, which raises the average level of
productivity embodied in capital. The Variety term in (36) reﬂects this variety eﬀect. This term is central
to our estimation and identiﬁcation strategy because it governs the curvature in the embodied productivity
level and in the observable measures of technology.
To better understand the diﬀerent natures of the embodiment and variety eﬀects, it is worthwhile to
consider Figure 1. It depicts the proﬁle of vintage productivity levels z
(τ)
v available on the world technology




τ,t have actually been adopted at time t.T h ee m b o d i m e n t
loss is the percentage diﬀerence between the productivity of the best vintage available in the world (i.e.
v
(s)
τ,t = t) and the productivity embodied in the best adopted vintage (i.e. v
(s)
τ,t). The eﬀect on z
(s)
τ,t of
increasing the number of adopted vintages is represented by triangle (a,b,c). The eﬀect of increasing the
number of varieties on the world technology frontier is triangle (a,d,e). Hence, the productivity loss from
the non-adopted varieties is given by 1 − [area(a,b,c)/area(a,d,e)] and is the graphical equivalent of the
variety loss.12
It is important to note that, for a given adoption lag, the contribution of the variety term to embodied
productivity is larger at the initial stages of diﬀusion. Initially, there are no vintages of a particular technology
type available, so the number of varieties grows inﬁnitely fast at the moment of adoption of the ﬁrst vintage
of type τ. As time goes on, the newly adopted vintages make up a smaller and smaller part of the total
set of available vintages. Therefore, the growth rate of the variety term declines over time. In the long
run, the loss in the variety term from an adoption lag goes to zero, and the only eﬀe c tt h a tt h el a gh a so n
productivity is through the reduction in the embodied productivity of the last vintage adopted. The evolution
of the importance of the variety eﬀect is what determines the curvature of the productivity embodied in the
technology type.




τ,t, evolve as follows: the logarithm of the user cost


































2.7 Reduced form equations
One approach to estimating γ
(s)
τ and the determinants of D
(s)
τ,t is to substitute (36), (37) and (38) into




τ for all τ in sector s directly. This approach is overly
12In Figure 1, γ
(s)
τ is the slope of the world technology frontier. What follows from the ﬁgure is that, for a given adoption
lag, an increase in γ
(s)
τ leads to a higher loss in the embodiment, as well as the variety, eﬀects.




τ enter these equations non-linearly and because zs,t is a highly
non-linear function of the parameters that we would like to estimate.13
In order to estimate γ
(s)
τ and the determinants of D
(s)





τ by linearizing (36) around the immediate adoption path in which D
(s)

































where Ψ(t;g)i sa sd e ﬁned in (31) and ψ(t;g) is its logarithm. Here −µψ(t;g)r e ﬂects the immediate
adoption path around which we log-linearize at every point in time and the adoption lag term reﬂects the
approximate deviation from that path.
We deal with the complications introduced by zs,t in two diﬀerent ways, depending on whether various
technologies are close substitutes in a sector or not.
For some technologies, we have no data on other technologies that are close substitutes. These technologies
are interpreted as belonging to a sector with just one technology type. In that case z
(s)




















τ,t − (1 − α)(yt − lt)
´
+ yt (40)
As we show in Appendix A, the equation for capital, (35), simpliﬁes similarly in this case.
For technologies for which we have data on close substitutes we diﬀerence zs,t out of our reduced form
equations. If we have two technology types, τ and τ0, that we consider close substitutes and therefore














































The actual reduced form equations that we estimate are obtained by substituting the linear approxima-
tions of the logarithm of the usercost (i.e. (37)) and of the logarithm of the technology types’ embodied






































































13Recall that this is the logarithm of a CES aggregate of Z
(s)
τ,t for all technology types τ in sector s.
14Note that, for technologies for which we do not have data on other technologies that are close substitutes, like televisions,
we estimate the elasticity of substitution with aggregate demand, ρs. For technologies that are close substitutes, like sail and
steam- and motorships, we estimate the elasticity of substitution between them, θs.
14We estimate equation (42) by pooling the observations for countries in our data set. Adoption lags can,
in principle, vary by country, over time, and across technologies. To understand what factors determine
adoption lags, we assume that D
(s)
τ,t is the same function of exogenous variables for all the countries over
















where xτ,t is a vector with determinants of the adoption lags. The coeﬃcient vector βτ reﬂects the marginal
embodiment gain in percentages caused by the associated determinant in xτ,t.Ap o s i t i v ec o e ﬃcient in βτ
means that an increase in the associated explanatory variable in xτ,t reduces adoption lags and thus the
embodiment loss.
2.8 Estimation and identiﬁcation
The regression equation (42) includes a time trend and a country dummy. The trend captures investment
speciﬁc technological change. The country-speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀects, ηc,τ, captures a potential country ﬁxed eﬀect
in the productivity embodied in the technology type and diﬀerences in units of measurement across countries
in some of the dependent variables15. The inclusion of these terms prevents us from identifying the adoption
lags through the relative intensity of use of a technology in a country or by the trends in the technology
measure.
The identiﬁcation of γ
(s)
τ and the determinants of D
(s)
τ,t instead exploits the curvature of the adoption
paths and the diﬀerent timing of this curvature across countries. More precisely, the growth rate of embodied


























evolution of the gains from variety in the world technology frontier; the faster embodied productivity growth,





τ /µ. For a given calibrated value of µ, this pins down our estimate of the growth rate
of embodied technological change in the technology type τ, γ
(s)
τ .
The eﬀect of the variables in xτ,t on the adoption lags is identiﬁed by the cross-country variation in
curvature and by the time series variation in curvature that is not predicted by the curvature of the world
technology frontier. These marginal embodiment gain parameters are jointly identiﬁed with the elasticity
parameter ηψ.T h i si sn o tap r o b l e mf o rt h ei d e n t i ﬁcation of βτ, however, because ηψ can be estimated by


















This highlights the importance of modelling the adoption decision at the worker level. It is exactly








and its logarithm that identify the
15We know, for example, that what is classiﬁed as an industrial robot tends to diﬀer across the countries in our sample.
15parameters of interest in our aggregate reduced form equations.
Figure 2 illustrates our approximation and identiﬁcation approach graphically. It plots the immediate
adoption path that we use as the time-varying approximation path for our adoption paths, as well as an
adoption path that is subject to a constant adoption lag, D
(s)
τ . It emphasizes two main points. First, what
matters for the adoption lags is how far the adoption path is from the long run linear trend. This distance is
determined by the curvature of the path. Thus, it is exactly the curvature in the adoption path that we use
to identify the adoption lags. Second, the adoption lags are quantiﬁed using the log-linear approximation,
which is also illustrated in the ﬁgure. Because of the highly non-linear nature of the adoption curve, this




In this section, we present the data used in the empirical analysis and the estimates we obtain for γ
(s)
τ and
the determinants of D
(s)
τ,t for each technology type, τ. We discuss the estimates, then use them to explore
the importance of the embodied mechanisms emphasized in our model for technology diﬀusion and growth.
We do that by: (i) exploring the goodness of ﬁt of the estimated adoption measures; (ii) computing the
actual growth in the productivity embodied in technology type τ,z
(s)
τ,t;a n d( iii) reporting the cross-country
dispersion in productivity embodied in each technology type.
3.1 Data
We use technology adoption data from Comin and Hobijn (2004) which covers 19 types of technologies, τ,
for 21 industrialized countries, j, over the period 1870 - 1998, t.W eh a v ec l a s s i ﬁed these technologies into
thirteen sectors, s. Table 1 lists the countries, sectors and technology types in our dataset. It also contains
the year that we use as the invention date, vτ, for our estimation, as well as whether the measure is an
output measure, Y, or a capital stock measure, K. The set of technologies we cover varies from electricity,
to textile spindles, to cars, to personal computers.
The historical nature of our technology adoption measures limits us to using only explanatory variables
for which we have long historical time series for the countries in our sample.
The main determinants that we allow for in the vector with explanatory variables, xτ,t, can be classiﬁed
into four groups: (i)h u m a nc a p i t a l ,( ii) openness and trade, (iii) quality of institutions and (iv)r e l a t i v e
level of overall advancement. The variables that we use are listed in Table 2.
The human capital variables are the average primary, secondary, and tertiary school enrollment rates
of the last ten cohorts that are at least 18 years old in year t. For tertiary enrollment, we only have data
from 1960 onwards and, thus, we only include tertiary enrollment as an explanatory variable for technologies
mainly adopted after 1960.
16The idea that skills and human capital can inﬂuence technology adoption dates back to at least Nelson
and Phelps (1966). Nelson and Phelps (1966) argue that human capital might matter for how far you are oﬀ
the frontier, as well as how quickly you converge to it. These two mechanisms are also present in our model
if human capital reduces adoption lags. That is, highly educated countries suﬀer a smaller embodiment loss
from the adoption lags. In addition, a smaller adoption lag speeds up the elimination of the loss from having
a smaller variety of vintages available for production and, therefore, leads to faster convergence.
In addition to the theoretical motivation for including human capital measures in xτ,t, there is ample
evidence, both on the aggregate (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) and microeconomic levels (Doms, Dunne, and
Troske, 1999 and Caselli and Coleman, 2001), that countries and organizations with more higly educated
workers are better able to adopt and absorb more advanced technologies.
Our proxy for openness and trade is deﬁned as imports plus exports as a percentage of GDP. There are
two channels through which trade might aﬀect adoption lags. First, as Holmes and Schmitz (2001) argue,
the increased foreign competition reﬂected in trade induces faster domestic technology adoption. Second,
trade causes knowledge spillovers. Coe and Helpman (1995) provide evidence that suggests that this is the
case for R&D. Such spillovers would likely reduce adoption costs and thus reduce adoption lags as well.
We approximate the quality of institutions by the Polity score, taken from Marshall and Jaggers (2002).
We renormalize this score such that 0 reﬂects a totalitarian autocracy and 1 indicates full democracy. There
is widespread evidence, including Hall and Jones (1999) and Acemoglu, Johnson, Robinson (2005), that the
quality of institutions matters for development. That institutions matter for development does not mean
that they matter for technology adoption, however. If institutional quality across the board increases the
productivity of all capital goods in place, it will likely not aﬀect the set of technologies used in production.
What matters for adoption is that institutions either aﬀect the barriers to adoption or aﬀect the relative
productivity levels of newer technologies.
When interpreting our results for institutions, one has to bear in mind that our analysis is limited to
a sample of 21 of the world’s industrialized leaders. For these countries, there is a lot of variation in the
quality of their institutions before WWII. After 1945, however, the Polity variable exhibits little cross-
country variation. We therefore do not include our institutional quality proxy for technologies that are
mainly adopted after 1945.
The last control that we include in xτ,t is the level of GDP per capita relative to the US. This captures the
idea that relatively advanced countries are more likely to have the appropriate resources and endowments
necessary for the adoption of the newest technologies. This is in the spirit of Basu and Weil’s (1998)
appropriate technology hypothesis.
Finally, our reduced form equation (42) includes a measure of the real interest rate to account for user
cost eﬀects on the demand for capital. We measure these by the U.S. ex-post real interest rates.16
16It is constructed using the sources listed in Table 2.
173.2 Parameter estimates and ﬁt
The results that we present are obtained by the estimation of (42) using non-linear generalized least squares.
We use generalized least squares to allow the variance of the residuals, uτ,t, to vary by country. The
estimation method we use can be interpreted as nonlinear GMM with deterministically trending variables,
as described in Andrews and McDermott (1995), and we use their results to calculate standard errors.
The parameters in our reduced form equations can be classiﬁed into three categories. The ﬁrst is the set
of parameters that we calibrate. The second are the reduced form parameters that we estimate, but that do
not provide us with information about adoption lags. The third are the parameters that we estimate and
that allow us to quantify adoption lags.
We calibrate two parameters, α and µ. We set α =0 .3, to match the 70 percent average post-war labor
share in the U.S. non-farm business sector. As shown in the Appendix A, we set µ =3 /14 to match the
average corporate proﬁt rate of 10 percent observed in the US since 1945.
The second set of parameters contains those reduced form parameters that do not directly pertain to
adoption lags. These are the country ﬁxed eﬀects, ηc,τ, the trend parameter ηT,τ, the user cost parameter
ηr,τ, and the demand elasticity parameter ηψ,τ. Because we focus on adoption lags, we do not report these
estimates.
The estimated parameters of interest are the growth rate of embodied technological change, γ
(s)
τ ,a n dt h e
marginal eﬀect of our explanatory variables on the embodiment gain, βτ. We present our results in three
tables, each covering a subset of technologies. Table 3 covers transportation related technologies, Table 4
covers communication technologies, and Table 5 covers manufacturing technologies and electricity.
For example, consider the ﬁrst column (I) of Table 3. The results in this column are for passenger aviation.
Our sample for this technology starts in 1920, ends in 1993 and covers 21 countries. The approximation path
is based on a 1919 invention date. R2 and “R2 detrended” are measures of the goodness of ﬁt. The estimated
growth rate of embodied technological change is 1.17 percent, which is the implied rate at which the quality
embodied in new passenger planes increases per year. The marginal eﬀect of secondary enrollment is that a
1 percent increase in secondary enrollment reduces adoption lags such that the quality of the best adopted
vintage increases by 0.45%. Similarly, a 1 percent increase in relative GDP increases the quality of the best
adopted vintage by 0.80 percent.
We start by considering the estimated rates of embodied technological change. The ﬁrst observation is
that, for 14 of our 19 technology types, we obtain estimates of the rate of embodied productivity that are
signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. The three highest rates of embodied technological change are estimated in
personal computers (4.89 percent), trucks (2.86) and robots (2.13). The technologies for which we obtain
an insigniﬁcant estimate of γ
(s)
τ are cars, radios, televisions, and ring and mule spindles. Taken literally,
these estimates imply that all technological progress for these technologies is investment-speciﬁca n dn o t
embodied.
18There are, however, three other likely reasons why these estimates are not signiﬁcant. First, if a technology
diﬀuses very quickly, like televisions, for example, there are too few years for which the curvature through
which we identify the rate of embodied technological change drives the technology adoption path. Second,
if there are very large adoption lags, the approximation we use might not be appropriate, and the estimated
rate of embodied technological change is likely to be biased downward to ﬁt the average adoption path across
countries. Finally, if a technology is relatively old, like the spindle types for the textiles technologies, then
the curvature and thus the rate of embodied technological change is hardly detectable by the time the sample
starts.
The growth rates of embodied technological change determine the average adoption approximation path,
but do not ﬁt any cross-country variation in adoption patterns. Cross-country variation is ﬁtted by either the
country ﬁxed eﬀects or by the adoption lag covariates included in the vector xτ,t.T h e r ea r et h r e ep o s i t i v e
observations we make based on our results obtained using the covariates.
First, as one would expect, we tend to ﬁnd the highest embodiment gains from education, trade, institu-
tions, and relative advancement for technologies that also have the highest rates of embodied technological
change. That is, our estimates are consistent with the implication of our theory that a reduction of adoption
lags yields higher productivity gains for technologies where the quality of new vintages grows faster. In our
s a m p l e ,t h i si sp a r t i c u l a r l yc l e a rf o ra v i ation, personal computers, and robots.
Second, we ﬁnd that the most signiﬁcant eﬀects, both economically and statistically, are for education.
Educational attainment seems to signiﬁcantly reduce adoption lags for technologies that were mainly adopted
in the post war period, like aviation, personal computers and robots. Further, the eﬀect of education on
the adoption of these technologies seems to be mainly through secondary and tertiary education. This
evidence is consistent with the view of skill-biased technological change becoming increasingly important in
recent decades. We also ﬁnd a large eﬀect of secondary education on the adoption of electricity. For older
technologies, like trucks and telephones, we ﬁnd that primary education signiﬁcantly reduces adoption lags;
however, these eﬀects are not economically signiﬁcant.
Third, openness seems to matter mainly for transportation technologies. This suggests that what drives
the eﬀect of openness on adoption is not spillovers but competitiveness concerns that might reduce barriers
to adoption, as argued by Holmes and Schmitz (2001). Openness also has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on electricity
adoption lags. This, however, seems to be driven by the fact that larger, less open economies, like the United
States, United Kingdom and Germany, were more rapid adopters of electricity.
Finally, there are several technologies for which our covariates are neither economically nor statistically
signiﬁcant. This is true for passenger transportation, telecommunication, and as well as steel and textiles.
This insigniﬁcance may result from three very diﬀerent reasons. First, if we believe in the estimate, this
implies that for such technologies educational attainment, trade, institutions, and relative advancement do
not matter much for adoption lags. That is, in countries with better educated workers, people might still
19use more phones but they simply do not seem to use a diﬀerent distribution of phone vintages. Second, we
use historical data to construct educational attainment and openness measures for the pre-war period. The
earlier data for the explanatory variables in our sample are likely to be more imprecise, biasing the estimated
coeﬃcients to zero. Third, for textiles and steel, we only have very short samples that cover periods much
more recent than the invention date. As a consequence, our sample misses the curvature in the measures of
these technologies, and in these cases we would expect our empirical strategy to be less appropriate.
After exploring the determinants of the adoption lags, it is worthwhile to consider how well our theory
of the evolution of technology ﬁts the data.
Figures 3 through 7 depict the actual and ﬁtted adoption paths for various technologies for the US,
Japan, France, the UK and Germany. The technologies plotted are personal computers, electricity, telecom-
munications, cargo aviation and merchant shipping. In these plots, the adoption path for each country is
represented by a line wih a diﬀerent marker. Actual data is represented by solid lines, while ﬁtted data is
represented by dashed lines.
The ﬁrst observation from these plots is that the model seems to ﬁt the curvature of the actual adoption
paths well. For all the technologies, the markers for ﬁtted and actual data are closely aligned.
There are a few cases where the model ﬁt seems to be less satisfactory. For computers, for example, the
model does not seem to capture the cross-country variation in the curvature of the adoption path. In the US
and Japan, the model does not generate suﬃcient curvature to match the very fast diﬀusion of computers.
A larger growth rate of embodied productivity would have generated this extra curvature but would fail to
capture the lower curvature displayed by the paths of computers in Germany and France. That could, in
principle, be matched if the newest vintages adopted in France and Germany at any moment of time were
closer to the world technology frontier. But the structure we have imposed on the relationship between the
adoption lags and our vector of covariates restricts the cross-country variation that the model can generate
in the adoption lags.
The R2 is a more systematic way of reporting the goodness of ﬁt of our model. The R2 lines in Tables
3 ,4a n d5l i s tt h eR2 for these curves. These measures are all very high, and have a median of 0.989. This
very high R2, however, is driven in large part by the trends and country ﬁxed eﬀects that the econometric
model includes. In this sense, they are artiﬁcially inﬂated, and it is diﬃcult to conclude that the mechanisms
emphasized by our model do a good job at explaining the diﬀusion paths on the basis of these R2s.
A more informative measure of the model’s ability to ﬁt the evolution of the adoption measures involves
computing the fraction of the sum of squares that remains after the ﬁxed eﬀect, trend and interest rate
eﬀects are ﬁltered out that is explained by the model. This fraction is listed in Tables 3 through 5 as
“R2 detrended.” The average detrended R2 across technologies is 0.63, with a median of 0.64. For those
technologies with fewer observations, like textiles, steel and robots, we obtain a slightly higher detrended R2
and those technologies with a bad ﬁt of the curvature, like radios and TV’s, have a detrended R2 lower than
200.5. These goodness of ﬁt measures suggest that our structural model explains a large part of the non-linear
features observed in the adoption patterns in the data, and therefore it is quite informative about both the
average diﬀusion curve for a representative technology type and the cross-country variation in the adoption
paths.
3 . 3 G r o w t hi ne m b o d i e dp r o d u c t i v i t y
Part of the interest in understanding the technology adoption processes resides in the belief that technology
adoption generates an important part of productivity growth. We are now in a position to explore how much
the embodiment and variety mechanisms emphasized by our model contribute to productivity growth and
how they determine observed diﬀerences in diﬀusion across technologies.
We use our parameter estimates to compute the time series of productivity embodied in each technology
type. More speciﬁcally, we compute the time-varying part of the log-level of productivity embodied in a



































Note that the ﬁrst term in this expression corresponds to the embodiment eﬀect while the last two correspond
to the variety eﬀects’ inﬂuence on the approximation path as well as the linear approximation of the variety
eﬀect of the adoption lags from (39). For each technology type, we then compute the average annual
increment in ˆ z
(s)






























The ﬁrst term in this equation captures the gain in embodied productivity at the world technology
frontier. The second term reﬂects the embodiment gain from catching up with the frontier. These two ﬁrst
terms together correspond to the growth in embodied productivity from the embodiment eﬀect. The third
term in (45) captures the growth in embodied productivity from the gains from an increase in variety at the
world technology frontier. The last term measures the additional gains from variety when the country is below
the frontier. The sum of the third and fourth terms corresponds to the growth in embodied productivity
associated with the increase in the number of vintages available for production.
For each technology type, we compute the growth rate of embodied productivity over the interval de-
scribed in the second column in Table 6. These intervals are selected based on the invention date of the
technology, the period over which the technology is relevant for production and the number of countries for
which data is available. For example, the interval for telephones and telegrams is 1913-90, while computers’
21interval is 1980-93. The third column of Table 6 reports the average annual growth rate in the productivity
embodied in each technology type over the interval. Columns 4 and 5 decompose this growth rate between
growth from the embodiment eﬀect and growth from the variety eﬀect.
The most interesting observation from Table 6 is that, for most technologies, the growth rate of embodied
productivity is substantial. The average annual growth rate across technologies is 7.3 percent, and the median
is 3.4 percent. For all the technologies in our sample except sail ships and mule spindles the average annual
growth rate of productivity embodied in the technology has been over one percent.
The low growth rate of embodied productivity in sail ships and mule spindles results from low growth
in both the embodiment and variety eﬀects. The low growth of the embodiment eﬀect is due to the low
estimate of γ
(s)
τ for these technologies. The small gains from the increase in varieties in these technologies
stem from the fact that these technologies were invented long before the beginning of the period considered
here. Thus there were already many available varieties, so the gains from increasing their number were very
small.
The average growth rate of embodied productivity over the relevant period is large for aviation, computers,
robots, TV’s, electricity, trucks and open hearth steel furnaces. Interestingly, diﬀerent forces drive the growth
in embodied productivity for diﬀerent technologies. In aviation, for example, the growth rate of embodied
productivity is driven mostly by the embodiment eﬀect. The increment in the embodiment component of
embodied productivity is driven, in turn, by two factors. First, the high estimate of γ
(s)
τ for both passenger
and cargo aviation implies that new vintages embody substantially more productivity than older vintages.
Second, the increase in human capital and in the degree of openness has reduced the average adoption lag
in the aviation technologies. This catch up with the world technology frontier in aviation has led to a higher
growth rate in the embodiment component of z
(s)
τ,t.
The case of personal computers is similar to aviation. New vintages of computers embody much more
productivity that older vintages, which explains a signiﬁcant fraction of the growth in the productivity of
computers. As with aviation technologies, the average adoption lag in computers has decreased over the
period covered by Table 6. In this case, the variable that seems to be responsible for this catch up with the
world technology frontier is the increase in tertiary enrollment. However, a very signiﬁcant fraction of the
growth in the productivity embodied in computers also comes from the growth in the variety component.
This eﬀe c ti si m p o r t a n td e s p i t et h el a r g ee s t i m a t eo fγ
(s)
τ for computers because the interval we consider is
relatively small and starts shortly after the invention of the technology.
Robots are a case in which most of the growth in embodied productivity comes from the growth in
the variety component. Growth in this component is more important for robots than for computers for
two reasons. First, the lower estimate of γ
(s)
τ for robots than for computers implies that the gains from
increasing the number of available varieties die out more slowly. As a result, the average growth in the
embodied productivity of robots from the increase in the number of robot varieties will be larger than for
22computers. In addition, the growth in productivity from the increase in the number of robot varieties is
larger than for computers because there is a larger average adoption lag in the adoption of robots than
in the adoption of computers. That is, the average country is further from the world technology frontier
in robots than in computers, and adding more vintages of robots to production signiﬁcantly increases the
average ideosyncratic productivity sampled by the workers. This dissection of the sources of the embodied
productivity growth of robots is also an accurate description of the determinants of the growth in embodied
productivity in TV’s, radios and electricity.
The determinants of the growth in productivity embodied in the remaining technologies in our sample
a r ep r e s e n t e di nT a b l e6 .F o rt h es a k eo fb r e v i t y ,w ed on o td e s c r i b et h e mi nd e t a i lh e r e .W h a ti sw o r t h w h i l e
noting is that, on average, the variety eﬀect is more important than the embodiment eﬀect as a source of
growth in embodied productivity over the periods and technologies studied here. In terms of the average
contribution to embodied productivity across technologies, the split is about 1/4 vs. 3/4. In terms of the
median contribution across technologies, the split between embodiment and variety is about 40 percent vs.
60 percent. This large contribution of the variety eﬀect is surprisingly large given the length of the sample
periods considered for most of the technologies in our analysis.
3.4 Cross-country disparities in adoption
The ﬁnal question that we explore in this paper is: ’How important are the two endogenous embodied
productivity mechanisms in generating cross-country variation in the level of embodied productivity?’
The sole source of cross-country variation in our model is the covariates that determine the adoption lags,
D
(s)











The above equation measures the loss in embodied productivity due to the adoption lags, both through the
embodiment and variety eﬀects.
Columns 3 and 6 of Table 7 report the standard deviation across countries of the log of embodied
productivity in each technology in the initial (column 2) and ﬁnal year (column 5) of the intervals considered
in the section 3.3. Columns 4 and 7 report the ratio of the cross-country variation in embodied productivity
for each technology relative to the cross-country variation in the log of GDP per capita for the same year
and the same countries.
Two main observations emerge from Table 7. The ﬁrst is that the cross-country dispersion in embodied
productivity relative to the dispersion in income per capita is very large for aviation (both cargo and pas-
sengers), radios, TV’s, PC’s, robots and electricity and small for the rest of the technologies in our sample.
23These are the technologies with higher estimates of γ
(s)
τ .17
The second observation is that, over time, the cross-country variation in embodied productivity has








declines over time since the
variety eﬀect declines with the number of adopted vintages. Second, there has been convergence across the
countries in our sample in the determinants of the adoption lags, D
(s)
τ,t.
The interest of TV’s and radios also resides in that they illustrate the ambiguity of the cross-country




τ has two eﬀects on (46). A higher γ
(s)
τ increases
the embodiment eﬀect, but decreases the gains from variety, and thus the variety eﬀect. This ambiguity
is reﬂected by the fact that the technologies for which the model predicts a large cross-country variation
in embodied productivity include some of the technologies with highest (computers and robots) and lowest
(TV’s and radios) productivity embodied in new vintages.
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper has presented a vintage capital model that incorporates economic mechanisms that are key for
the diﬀusion paths of technologies. The shapes of these paths are in large part determined by two important
components. The ﬁrst, the embodiment eﬀect, is the rate of embodied technological change, which reﬂects
how much better new technology vintages are than older ones. The second, the variety eﬀect, is the gains
from varieties induced by the introduction of new vintages.
The predictions of the model for the curvature of the diﬀusion path allows us to estimate, for each
technology, the rate of productivity embodied in new vintages and the determinants of adoption lags. We
have used these estimates to explore the determinants of the variation of the speed of technology diﬀusion
both across technologies and across countries.
Several conclusions are worth noting. First, the model does a satisfactory job at ﬁtting the diﬀusion
curves. Second, the two adoption margins matter diﬀerently for diﬀerent technologies. For some technologies,
such as PC’s and aviation, the growth rate of productivity embodied in new vintages is large and statistically
signiﬁcant. For others, such as TV’s and radios, the fast growth in embodied productivity is mostly driven
by the increase in the available number of varieties. Finally, for others, such as electricity and robots, the
speed of diﬀusion has been fast both because of the rapid productivity growth embodied in new vintages
and because of the increase in the number of varieties. This heterogeneity in the results emphasizes, in our
view, the importance of multi-technology studies.
In terms of the adoption lags, we ﬁnd that technologies such as PC’s, robots and electricity are comple-
mentary to human capital in the sense that human capital reduces the adoption lags for these technologies.
Openness to trade tends to reduce the adoption lags of transportation technologies. These factors generate
17For these technologies, the cross-country variation in the growth rates of embodied productivity is also large.
24a substantial cross-country variation in the TFP embodied in technology. Other factors, such as the degree
of democracy, might still aﬀect the intensity with which technologies are used, but do not seem to be very
important in explaining which technology vintages are being used.
The line of research developed in this paper leaves several doors open for future research. First, it would
be interesting to compare the panel of embodied productivity estimates generated from our model with
actual data on TFP at the sector level.18 A second line of research consists of bringing the intensity of use
of technologies back into the picture and try to use variation in this margin to test the relevance of various
sources of barriers to technology adoption. 19 Finally, it will be interesting to extend this analysis to other
technologies and countries. It may well be the case that the factors that impinge on technology adoption in
advanced economies are diﬀerent from those that slow down adoption in poor countries.
18One potential diﬃculty of pursuing this route at this point is the quality of sectoral TFP data.
19One exercise along this line is Comin and Hobijn(2005), who use cross-country variation in institutions and cross-technology
variation in the presence of close substitute technologies to show that lobbies constitute an important barrier to technology
diﬀusion.
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28A Mathematical details
Derivation of equation (10)




















































































































C,w h e r eC = e−γµΓ(1 − µ)
where Γ(1 − µ) is the gamma function.
Derivation of equation (11)




























Substituting in the solution for the shares, S
(τ)




















































Derivation of equation (18):
We derive the capital demand function by combining the result that rental expenses exhaust a fraction α of revenue









































































































29Where the current value Hamiltonian, H
(τ)


































































































































































































Derivation of equation (19):
When we solve for the present discounted value of the monopolist proﬁts for the provider of technology vintage v of technology








































































































Derivation of equation (23):









































30This implies that the free entry condition reads

































































which is equivalent to (23).
Derivation of equation (25):













































































































































and Zs,t is as deﬁned in the main text.
Derivation of equation (30):






















































































































































which can be rewritten in the form (30).























































































Derivation of equations (34) and (35):
































































































τ,t + yt (80)




















ps,t = α[ln(1 + η) − lnη − lnα] − ((1 − α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t)+( 1− α)(yt − lt)( 8 2 )




τ,t in the form of (34) and (35), where
c
(s)









+( 1− ρs)α[ln(1 + η) − lnη − lnα]( 8 4 )





































































































































32Taking logarithms, we obtain (36) where
c
(s)
τ,z =l nC +l nµ − lnγ
(s)
τ (86)
Derivation of equation (39):
Linearization of (36) around D
(s)

































































































































Derivation of equation (40):















− [(1 − α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t]
o
(88)
+ρs [(1 − α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t] − ρs (1 − α)(yt − lt)+yt
the ﬁrst term, which reﬂects relative demand within the sector, cancels when z
(s)
τ,t = zs,t, q
(s)
τ,t = qs,t,a n duc
(s)
τ,t = ucs,t,a n dw e
obtain (40).















− [(1 − α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t]
o
(89)





−(ρs − 1)(1 − α)(yt − lt)+yt
which, when z
(s)
τ,t = zs,t, q
(s)
τ,t = qs,t,a n duc
(s)























where the last two terms reﬂect the relative price of capital of technology type τ.
Derivation of equation (41):
















+(ρs − θs)[(1− α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t] − ρs (1 − α)(yt − lt)+yt
such that because
(ρs − θs)[(1− α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t] − ρs (1 − α)(yt − lt)+yt (92)
is the same for all technology types in the same sector. This is the case because the overall demand for output from the sector




τ0,t as in (40).














































































τ0,t − (1 − α)(yt − lt)
33Neither (40) nor either of the two equations above depend on zs,t.
Derivation of equations (42):






























that can be derived in a similar manner.










= ((1 − α)zs,t − αqs,t − αucs,t)( 9 5 )





































































































ψ =( 1− α)ρs (99)
we obtain (42), where u
(1)












































































































































































































































































ψ =( 1− α)θs (104)
and u
(2)
τ,t can be interpreted as the approximation and measurement error.




































































































































T,τ (t − vτ)+η
(5)






























































which completes the set of ﬁve reduced form equations that we estimate for the diﬀerent technology types.
Calibration of µ
We calibrate µ b a s e do np r o ﬁt rates. Our model implies that rental expenditures on capital goods make up a fraction α of
revenue for each vintage, technology and sector. Of this fraction α, a fraction 1/(1 + η) ﬂo w sa sp r o ﬁts to the capital goods











The average share of corporate proﬁts in national income (sprofits) in the US since 1945 has been approximately 10 percent.













35Table 1: Countries and technology measures covered in the data.
j Country s τ v
(s)
τ Type Technology sector/type
1. Australia I Passenger aviation
2. Austria 1 1919 Y Aviation passengers (passenger kilometers, PKM)
3. Belgium II Passenger transportation
4. Canada 1 1825 Y Passenger traﬃc on railways (passenger kilometers, PKM)
5. Denmark 2 1885 K Number of passenger cars
6. Finland III Cargo aviation
7. France 1 1919 Y Aviation cargo (ton kilometers, TKM)
8. Germany IV Cargo transportation
9. Greece 1 1825 Y Freight traﬃco nr a i l w a y s( t o nk i l o m e t e r s ,T K M )
10. Ireland 2 1885 K Number of commercial trucks
11. Italy V Merchant shipping
12. Japan 1 1606 K Tonnage of sailships in merchant ﬂeet
13. Netherlands 2 1788 K Tonnage of steam- and motorships in merchant ﬂeet
14. New Zealand VI Telecommunications
15. Norway 1 1835 Y Telegrams sent
16. Portugal 2 1876 K Number of mainline telephones
17. Spain VII Radio
18. Sweden 1 1920 K Number of radios
19. Switzerland VIII Television
20. United Kingdom 1 1924 K Number of televisions
21. United States IX Personal computer
1 1976 K Number of personal computers
t Sample X Textiles
1870 1 1779 K Number of mule spindles
1998 2 1828 K Number of ring spindles
XI Steel
1 1867 Y Steel tonnage produced using Open Hearth furnaces
2 1950 Y Steel tonnage produced using Blast Oxygen furnaces
XII Robots
1 1962 K Number of industrial robots in manufacturing
XIII Electricity
1 1879 Y KWHr produced
36Table 2: Explanatory variables
Measure
User cost of capital
Real interest rate Description:
Ex-post real interest rate: Average annual long bond yield minus
inﬂation for the United States
Source:
Bond yields from Homer and Sylla (2005). Inﬂation from
Mitchell (1998) and from Bureau of Labor Statistics’s CPI release
(i) Human capital
Primary enrollment rate Description: Fraction of eligible aged children enrolled in primary school
Source: Comin and Hobijn (2004), Barro and Lee (1994)
Secondary enrollment rate Description: Fraction of eligible aged children enrolled in secondary school
Source: Comin and Hobijn (2004), Barro and Lee (1994)
Tertiary enrollment rate Description: Fraction of eligible aged children enrolled in tertiary education
Source: Comin and Hobijn (2004), Barro and Lee (1994)
(ii) Trade and openness
Openness Description: Sum of imports and exports as a fraction of GDP
Source: Comin and Hobijn (2004)
(iii) Relative overall advancement
Log relative real GDP per capita Description: Log of real GDP per capita of country minus that of the U.S.
Source: Comin and Hobijn (2004) and Maddison (1995)
(iv) Institutions
Polity Score Description:
Renormalized Polity IV score.
0=f u l la u t o c r a c y ,1=f u l ld e m o c r a c y
Source: Marshall and Jaggers (2002)
37T a b l e3 :S a m p l es i z ea n de s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃcients (Transportation)
s I II III IV V
Passenger Passenger Cargo Cargo Merchant
aviation transportation aviation transportation shipping
Sample
start 1920 1895 1931 1906 1870
end 1993 1993 1991 1993 1991
no. countries 21 17 21 17 13
no. observations 1079 923 889 962 601
Goodness of ﬁt
R2 .989 .976 .997 .989 .940
R2 detrended .635 .596 .634 .641 .642
Technology type
τ Planes Trains Cars Planes Trains Trucks Sail Steam/Motor
v
(s)
τ 1919 1825 1885 1919 1825 1885 1606 1788








































































































∗∗ denotes signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at a 1% signiﬁcance level, ∗ denotes the same for 5% signiﬁcance level
38Table 4: Sample size and estimated coeﬃcients (Communication and Computers)
s VI VII VIII IX
Tele- Radio TV PC
communication
Sample
start 1888 1926 1947 1980
end 1993 1973 1993 1998
no. countries 21 21 21 21
no. observations 1287 566 728 233
Goodness of ﬁt
R2 .989 .994 .975 .999
R2 detrended .363 .375 .450 .778
Technology type
τ Telegrams Telephones Radios TVs PCs
v
(s)
τ 1835 1876 1920 1924 1976






























































∗∗ denotes signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at a 1% signiﬁcance level, ∗ denotes the same for 5% signiﬁcance level39
39T a b l e5 :S a m p l es i z ea n de s t i m a t e dc o e ﬃcients (Manufacturing and electricity)
s XX I X I I X I I I
Textiles Steel Robots Electricity
Sample
start 1908 1960 1981 1879
end 1954 1993 1998 1993
no. countries 18 14 17 21
no. observations 157 185 240 1300
Goodness of ﬁt
R2 .959 .930 .998 .980
R2 detrended .942 .730 .762 .671
Technology type
τ Mule Ring OHF BOF Robots KWHr
v
(s)
τ 1770 1828 1867 1950 1962 1879






































































∗∗ denotes signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from 0 at a 1% signiﬁcance level, ∗ denotes the same for 5% signiﬁcance level
40Table 6: Growth rate of the productivity embodied in each technology type and its decomposition
Technology Period ∆z Embodiment Variety
Frontier Catch up Frontier Lags
Aviation cargo 1937-90 0.041 0.019 0.012 0.019 -0.009
Aviation passengers 1937-90 0.066 0.012 0.040 0.013 0.001
Train passengers 1913-90 0.013 0.005 0.000 0.006 0.001
Train cargo 1913-90 0.021 0.011 0.000 0.011 0.000
Cars 1930-90 0.006 0.002 0.000 0.004 0.000
Trucks 1930-90 0.055 0.029 0.000 0.027 0.000
Sail ships 1913-90 0.003 0.001 0.000 0.002 0.000
Steam/motor ships 1913-90 0.011 0.006 0.000 0.006 0.000
Telegrams 1913-90 0.018 0.009 0.000 0.008 0.001
Telephones 1913-90 0.013 0.006 0.000 0.007 0.000
Radios 1930-90 0.038 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.030
TV’s 1950-90 0.129 0.001 0.002 0.005 0.122
PC’s 1980-93 0.237 0.049 0.015 0.053 0.120
Robots 1975-93 0.483 0.021 0.040 0.024 0.399
Electricity 1930-90 0.146 0.001 0.010 0.003 0.132
Steel open hearth 1930-88 0.048 0.017 0.000 0.017 0.014
Steel blast oxygen 1961-90 0.034 0.016 0.000 0.019 -0.002
Mule spindles 1913-70 0.006 0.003 0.000 0.003 0.000
Ring spindles 1913-70 0.013 0.007 0.000 0.007 0.000
Average 0.073 0.017
∆z denotes the average annual growth rate in embodied productivity for the technology over the period.
41Table 7: Descriptive statistics of estimated level of Z due to embodiment and variety mechanisms









Aviation cargo 1937 0.530 1.755 1990 0.204 0.977
Aviation passengers 1937 0.938 3.029 1990 0.511 2.443
Train passengers 1913 0.001 0.002 1990 0.000 0.002
Train cargo 1913 0.012 0.031 1990 0.005 0.026
Cars 1930 0.001 0.002 1990 0.000 0.001
Trucks 1930 0.009 0.026 1990 0.005 0.026
Sail ships 1913 0.024 0.063 1990 0.011 0.052
Steam/motor ships 1913 0.024 0.063 1990 0.011 0.053
Telegrams 1913 0.001 0.003 1990 0.001 0.003
Telephones 1913 0.001 0.004 1990 0.001 0.003
Radios 1930 0.966 2.675 1990 0.120 0.572
TV’s 1950 1.153 2.396 1990 0.157 0.752
PC’s 1980 0.461 2.031 1993 0.326 1.642
Robots 1975 0.740 3.085 1993 0.432 2.178
Electricity 1930 0.946 2.618 1990 0.256 1.223
Steel open hearth 1930 0.001 0.001 1988 0.000 0.001
Steel blast oxygen 1961 0.001 0.001 1993 0.000 0.001
Mule spindles 1913 0.002 0.005 1970 0.001 0.002
Ring spindles 1913 0.002 0.005 1970 0.001 0.002
Std denotes standard deviation. (y − l) is log real GDP per capita.
42Figure 1: Decomposition of technology type total factor productivity level
43Figure 2: Approximation of adoption lags around immediation adoption path
44Figure 3: Actual and ﬁtted adoption paths for personal computers
45Figure 4: Actual and ﬁtted adoption paths for electricity
46Figure 5: Actual and ﬁtted adoption paths for telecommunications
47Figure 6: Actual and ﬁtted adoption paths for cargo aviation
48Figure 7: Actual and ﬁtted adoption paths for merchant shipping
49